The End of Technocracy? No Room for a "Bangladesh Option" in Pakistan by Wolf, Siegfried O.
1 
 
 
 
             Spotlight South Asia  
                 
                             
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           May 2013 
                                           ISSN 2195-2787  
Paper No. 7  
 
The End of Technocracy?  
No Room for a ‘Bangladesh Option’ 
in Pakistan 
Author: Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf (Heidelberg) 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
SSA ist eine regelmäßig erscheinende Analyse-
Reihe mit einem Fokus auf aktuelle politische 
Ereignisse und Situationen Südasien betreffend. 
Die Reihe soll Einblicke schaffen, Situationen 
erklären und Politikempfehlungen geben. 
 
SSA is a frequently published analysis series 
with a focus on current political events and 
situations concerning South Asia. The series 
should present insights, explain situations and 
give policy recommendations. 
 
 
APSA (Angewandte Politikwissenschaft 
Südasiens) ist ein auf Forschungsförderung und 
wissenschaftliche Beratung ausgelegter 
Stiftungsfonds im Bereich der Politikwissenschaft 
Südasiens. 
 
APSA (Applied Political Science of South Asia) is 
a foundation aiming at promoting science and 
scientific consultancy in the realm of political 
science of South Asia. 
 
 
Die Meinungen in dieser Ausgabe sind einzig die 
der Autoren und werden sich nicht von APSA zu 
eigen gemacht. 
 
The views expressed in this paper are solely the 
views of the authors and are not in any way 
owned by APSA. 
 
 
 
 
 
Impressum: 
APSA 
Im Neuehnheimer Feld 330 
D-69120 Heidelberg 
contact@apsa.info 
www.apsa.info 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgment: 
The author is grateful to the South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF), Brussels 
 for the extended support on this report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
The End of Technocracy? No Room for a ‘Bangladesh Option’ in Pakistan 
 
The Puzzle 
 
Francis Fukuyama (1989) famously put forward the view that the universalization of 
Western liberal democracy is the final form of human government. The following analysis 
draws on the premise that there is no alternative to liberal democracy (Diamond, 2008; 
Diamond & Morlino, 2005) as the best form of governance. In general, the concept of 
‘democracy’ is understood as the abstract notion of ‘people’s sovereignty’ that is flanked by 
the democratic ‘core values’ (Brettschneider, 2006) of ‘equality’ and ‘liberty’ (Diamond & 
Morlino, 2005I). In spite of this commonly accepted understanding, democracy is an 
‘essentially contested concept’ (Gallie, 1956). This means that there is a widespread 
agreement on the abstract notion of democracy and its core values, but it remains at the 
centre of scholarly debate about what might be the best implementation thereof. The 
different understandings of how to realize these principles have led to multiple 
interpretations of democracy from a minimalist ‘electoral’ type to the more comprehensive 
concepts of ‘participatory democracy’1, ‘deliberative’, or ‘strong’ democracies2 (Held, 2006; 
Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf, 2010). There is, however, a clear notion that all power 
should rest in the citizenry and that the will of the citizens should be the ultimate source of 
legitimacy for political power and subsequent decision-making. As such, democracy is a 
form of government in which political power exclusively derives from the ‘freely expressed 
will of the people whereby all individuals are to be treated as equals’ (Hadenius, 1992). 
‘Liberal democracy’ adds to the electoral minimum, a regime of fundamental civil rights, the 
rule of law, the institutionalization of horizontal accountability as well as civilian control over 
the military (Croissant/Kuehn/Chambers/Wolf, 2010). Having said this, political actors who 
                                                 
1
 See for example, O’Donnell/Schmitter/Whitehead 1986; Huntington 1991; Linz/Stepan 1996. 
2
 See for example Cohen 1989; Gutmann/Thompson 2002; Barber 1984. 
5 
represent the people in the political system must depend on the approval of the governed 
and must act according to civic consent. This is all well and fine in theory, but so far the 
political reality in Pakistan is quite different. 
 In the first months of 2013, the likelihood of an extra-constitutional caretaker government 
as seen in Bangladesh between 2007-2009 (also known as the ‘Bangladesh Option’ or 
‘Bangladesh Model’) has become a leading topic in Pakistan among political observers and 
especially the country’s private media. But besides a weak reference to what this means –a 
quiet coup in Bangladesh, engineered by the army in January 2007 and legitimised by the 
judiciary which resulted in a two-year suspension of democracy in favour of an unelected 
administration of ‘technocrats’3– not much is known about the Bangladesh Option and the 
implications of the responsible caretaker government. (The Economist, 19.1.2013; Ahsan, 
2011). Although there are some studies that analyse the caretaker government of 1996 and 
2001 as well as the consolidation of democracy in Bangladesh, relatively little attention has 
been paid to the role of the caretaker government of 2007-2009 thus far. There is a lot of 
emphasis on and appraisal of the achievements of this technocratic and military backed 
interim government but not much has been written about the tremendously negative 
impacts of these governments on the observation of human rights, and democratic values, 
norms and procedures. Furthermore, since the caretaker government acted far beyond its 
constitutionally limited life span, a clear breach of democratic legitimacy was made. This is 
especially relevant, because, according to Shain and Linz (1992), caretaker governments 
may affect the constitutional framework and the nature of the future political system, the 
degree of political openness, its respect for human rights, or the influence of certain key 
institutions, especially the armed forces. These factors determine to a large extent whether 
a country will go down the path of authoritarianism or progresses towards democratic 
                                                 
3
 Ahsan (2013) is emphasizing that ‘caretaker governments have by and large been symbolic of administration through 
technocracy. 
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transition. Having this in mind, the paper elaborates and assesses the latest Bangladesh 
caretaker government in the light of its course and outcome for consolidation of democracy 
in Bangladesh. Furthermore, it will emphasize that the generalization which one can draw 
out of the Bangladesh experience of caretaker governments highlight their highly 
undemocratic nature. Implementing such a model in Pakistan could do additional harm to 
the already eroding state of democracy. This article shall therefore analyse the latest 
Bangladesh caretaker government through the prism of civil-military relations as well. Such 
a focus is relevant because the Bangladesh Option emerged not only out of a lack of 
civilian control over the armed forces but it also extended the political role and influence of 
the military in Bangladesh. Because of this, the main argument guiding this work is that any 
interim government like the one in Bangladesh which is outside the legitimacy of the 
constitution will further worsen the civil-military relations as it hampers civilian efforts to 
establish control over the armed forces, which is a conditio sine qua non for the 
consolidation of democracy. It is imperative that any disturbance and derailment of free and 
fair elections and the subsequent transfer of power has to be avoided, especially when free 
and fair elections are in their evolutionary stage in Pakistan. 
 
Introduction - Contextualizing the Caretaker Government Phenomenon in Pakistan 
 
Based on the criteria of liberal democracy, most international analysts agree that Pakistan 
is a failed democracy. Upon its inception, Pakistan was envisioned to be a parliamentary 
democratic system, but due to the country’s unfortunate colonial legacy and its post-
Partition political developments it never became a part of the story of the global triumph of 
democracy. This is because the process of democratization in the country was and is not a 
linear one. In other words, there is no clear-cut juncture, as in India (apart from the 1975-
1977 state of emergency under the Indira Gandhi-administration), where the transition after 
7 
the end of the authoritarian British Raj marked and uninterrupted, linear process of 
stabilisation and consolidation towards democracy. Instead, Pakistan’s political dynamics 
are characterised by a persistent oscillation between elected political authoritarianism and 
military or semi-military regime types (see tables 1 & 2). After the transformative period of 
military-bureaucratic domination between 1947 and 1972, the country witnessed –
interrupted by two military interregnums– three rudimentary attempts towards 
democratisation (1971-1977, 1988-1999, 2008 onwards, see Table 1).  
     
    Table 1: Patterns of Rule in Pakistan 
Structure of Leadership*  Duration  Period  
Direct Military Rule  17 years  1958-1962:  Ayub Khan  
1962-1971:  Yahya Khan  
1977-1985:  Zia-ul-Haq  
1999-2002:  Pervez Musharraf  
Elected government under a 
military president**  
15 Years  1962-1969:  Ayub Khan  
1985-1988:  Zia-ul-Haq  
2002-2007:  Pervez Musharraf  
Elected government under a 
civilian president ***  
11 years 
1988-1999  
(1) 1988 - 1990:  Benazir Bhutto  
(2) 1990 - 1993:  Nawaz Sharif  
(3) 1993 - 1996:  Benazir Bhutto  
(4) 1997 - 1999:  Nawaz Sharif  
(5) 2008 – 2013: Yousaf Raza Gillani/ 
                            Raja Pervez Ashraf 
Semi-Civilian (non-elected) 
political government****  
11 years 
1947-1958  
(1) 1947-1951:  Liaquat Ali Khan  
(2) 1951-1953:  Muhammad Ali Bogra  
(3) 1953-1955:  Chaudry Muhammad Ali  
(4) 1956-1957:  Husey Shahhed Suhrawardy  
(5) 1957-1958:  Sir Feroz Khan Noon 
Civil-Military Equilibrium *****  6 years  1971-1977:  Zulfikar Ali Bhutto  
Notes: * The formulated structures of leadership for the various periods represent models to express the 
dominant style of governance and political management; Interim-governments and Prime-Minister under Military 
President/rule are not taken into account; ** Also referred to as a post-military period, this specifies the military 
exercise of political influence via a retired or serving general as president; *** Also known as the ‘Rule of Troika’, 
the armed forces influence the political decision-making-process under civilian governments from the sidelines; 
**** supremacy of non-parliamentary forces (bureaucracy) under formal parliamentary rule; ***** The rule of Z.A. 
Bhutto is called Equilibrium here, not Civilian Supremacy despite the fact that civilians had gained extensive 
civilian control, but the governmental limits were still set by the military.
4  
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 Source: Own compilation based on Rizvi (2004:3), Cohen (1984:6-10), Waseem (2007:5). 
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In this context one has to state that on one side the democratic transitions were caused 
and facilitated by political interventions of the armed forces, but on the other side, the 
democratisation phases were conditioned and hampered by the military. This was mostly 
because neither the non-elected bureaucrats (who were running the affairs of the country 
during the initial years until the first coup by General Ayub Khan in 1958 was staged), nor 
the following alternating governments of elected politicians (i.e. civilians) and militaries 
were able and willing to establish functional and effective political institutions. 
Consequently, a dysfunctional ‘pseudo-democratic’ political system based on patron-client 
relationships in which the major civilian institutions were paralysing each other was 
established and political decisions were made by a small group of exclusive feudal and 
industrialist elites, which is often referred to as ‘The Establishment’. One of the most 
revealing features that seriously inhibit the quality of democracy is the continuous 
truncation of the electoral process. Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has 
experienced a troubled electoral history. It took more than two decades until the country 
saw its first general elections in 1970 which resulted in the secession of East Pakistan 
(present-day Bangladesh) due to the fact that the authoritarian rule did not accept the 
election results. Since then, all elections until 2008 after the latest military ruler, Pervez 
Musharraf, resigned were consistently rigged by the country’s armed forces and 
intelligence agencies.  
Keeping this trajectory in mind, the question that arises today is whether the last five years 
were just a brief intermezzo of elected governance after which the military top brass may 
once again find it necessary to take matters ‘more formally’ into their own hands. It is in this 
context that several observers claim that Pakistan is not on the eve of a critical juncture 
that will break the patterns of traditionally military-dominated politics which would 
subsequently lead to a consolidation of democracy. They are convinced that the basic 
determinants which were responsible for military takeovers in the past have not changed 
9 
fundamentally. Protagonists of this point of view are of the opinion that one has to expect 
once again a ‘visible intervention’ by forces who are not in favour of a democratic transfer 
of power (from one civilian government to another one), which would be a first in the 
country’s troubled political transitions. This debate gained momentum after statements of 
Pakistani Senator Raza Rabbani who warned about potential attempts of initiating a 
political rollback by anti-democratic forces by undermining the constitutional and political 
achievements of the current government. He even went a ‘dramatic step’ further by raising 
serious concerns about the potential threat of the establishment of an extra-constitutional 
caretaker government in order to derail the upcoming elections. This alarm signal seemed 
even more plausible in the context of the sudden appearance of the influential cleric 
Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri who demanded the resignation of the current government 
before the end of its term in favour of an extra-constitutional caretaker government of 
technocrats which should have the support of non-electoral institutions, namely the 
Supreme Court and the military.  
Aside from Qadri’s ‘anti-democratic harassment’, in March 2013 in Pakistan’s chequered 
political landscape a democratically elected civilian government has completed its full five-
year term. At the end of the government’s term, power was handed over to a caretaker set-
up which paved the way for a democratic transfer of power following the general election 
on May 11th. Nevertheless, the country’s formidable socio-economic and political 
challenges combined with widespread popular dissatisfaction over the performance of the 
leading politicians (especially the last government during the presidency of Asif Ali Zardari) 
make that there was and still is much talk about the necessity of a ‘Bangladesh Option’ for 
Pakistan.  
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    Table 2: Dissolutions of Governments/National Assemblies: 1947-2009 
Year  Parliament 
Dissolved by  
Dismissal of 
Government  
Type of 
Dismissed 
Government  
New Leadership 
Habitus  
New Installed 
Regime-type  
1953  Ghulam 
Muhammad 
(Appointed 
Civilian
+
)  
Khawaja 
Nazimuddin  
(Appointed 
Civilian*)  
Civilian  
(Bureaucratis
ed)  
Governor General**  
(civilian)  
Civilian 
(Bureaucratised)  
1954  Ghulam 
Muhammad  
(Appointed 
Civilian
+
)  
M. Ali Bogra  
(Appointed 
Civilian***)  
Civilian  
(Bureaucratis
ed)  
Governor General 
(Bureaucrat)  
Civilian 
(Militarized-
Bureaucracy****) 
1957  General Iskander 
Mirza (Elected  
Civilian
+
)  
H. Shaheed 
Suhrawardy 
(Appointed 
Civilian
++
)  
Civilian  Governor General 
(Militarized-
Bureaucrat
+++
)  
Civilian 
(Militarized-
Bureaucracy)  
1958  General Iskander 
Mirza (Elected 
Civilian
+ 
*****)  
Malik Feroz 
Khan Noon 
(Appointed 
Civilian
++++
)  
Civilian 
(Militarized-
Bureaucracy)  
President 
(Bureaucrat)  
Civilian 
(Militarized-
Bureaucracy)  
1958  General Ayub 
Khan  
(Military, by Coup)  
Iskander 
Mirza  
(Elected 
Civilian)  
Civilian 
(Militarized-
Bureaucracy)  
C-in-C (Chief Martial 
Law Administrator), 
later President  
Military  
1969  P General Yahya 
Khan (Military, 
appointed)  
General 
Ayub Khan  
(Military, by 
Coup)  
Military  C-in-C (Chief Martial 
Law Administrator)  
Military  
1977  P General Zia-ul-
Haq (Military, by 
Coup)  
Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto  
(Elected 
Civilian)  
Military  C-in-C (Chief Martial 
Law Administrator)  
Military  
1988  General Zia-ul-
Haq (Military, by 
Coup)  
M. Khan 
Junejo  
(Appointed 
Civilian)  
Military  President  Military 
(civilianised)  
1990  Ghulam Ishaq 
Khan (Civilian
+
)  
Benazir 
Bhutto  
(Elected 
Civilian)  
Civilian  
(Militarized-
Bureaucracy)  
President 
(Bureaucrat)  
Civilian 
(militarized-
bureaucratic 
influence)  
1993  Ghulam Ishaq 
Khan  
 (Civilian
+
)  
Mian Nawaz 
Sharif  
(Elected 
Civilian)  
Civilian  
(Militarized-
Bureaucracy)  
President 
(Bureaucrat)  
Civilian 
(militarized-
bureaucratic 
influence)  
1996  Faroop Leghari 
(Civilian
+
)  
Benazir 
Bhutto  
(Elected 
Civilian)  
Civilian  
(Militarized-
Bureaucracy)  
President  Civilian 
(militarized-
bureaucratic 
influence)  
1999  Pervez Musharraf  
(Military)  
Mian Nawaz 
Sharif  
(Elected 
Civilian  
(re-
Civilianised- 
COAS (Chief 
Executive); later 
President  
Civilian 
(militarized-
bureaucratic 
11 
Civilian)  Bureaucracy)  influence)  
2001  Chief Executive 
Pervez Musharraf 
(Military)  
President  
Mohammad 
Rafiq Tarar  
Military 
(civilianised)  
President  
(Self-appointed)  
Civilian 
(militarized-
bureaucratic 
influence)  
2008  Yousaf Raza 
Gillani/ Raja 
Pervez Ashraf 
Pervez 
Musharraf 
(Military)  
Civilian  Prime 
Minister/President 
(civilian)  
Civilian  
Note: 
+
All dismissals by Civilians are backed by the Military; *selected/appointed by the cabinet, dominated 
by bureaucrats; ** “In the newly independent dominion political authority was transferred to a Governor-
General and a Constitutional Assembly the members of which were taken from those deputies of the Indian 
Central Assembly who had opted for Pakistan”
5
; *** Governor General of Pakistan Ghulam Muhammad 
dismissed civilian PM Khawaja Nazimuddin; **** The crucial features which turned the Bureaucratised-
Civilian into a Civilian-Militarized-Bureaucracy type of regime were (1) the Amadiyya riots of 1953, which 
underlined the inability of civilian bureaucrats to control state affairs without military support (a process which 
had already started in 1948 with the police riots in Dhaka/East-Pakistan and student protests during that 
year); (2) that Ghulam Muhammad ensured the support of the Army for the dismissal of the Nizamuddin 
government
6
; ***** Ghulam Muhammad (a former Army General) was, in 1956, officially elected President 
though all presidential elections are carried out indirectly by the assemblies; 
++
 Appointed by Governor 
General (GG) of Pakistan Iskander Mirza despite the fact that he was informally forced out of office by the 
bureaucratic-military establishment under GG Mirza; 
+++
 In this sense, “Militarized” means – a civilian with a 
military mindset based on socialization (training, education and service) in the armed forces; 
++++
 Based on 
the 1956 constitution, Khan was appointed by the President (before Governor General).
7
  
 
Concept of Caretaker Government – The Bangladesh Model 
 
A peculiarity of the Constitution of Bangladesh is the provision for holding general elections 
under a caretaker government. According to this constitution, the term caretaker 
government refers to a neutral, non-partisan and non-party interim government that is 
responsible for ensuring free, fair and impartial general elections after a parliament’s 
mandate has come to an end. In order to provide the caretaker government with the 
necessary legitimacy, the 13th amendment to the Constitution was passed on 26 March 
1996. According to this provision, such a government must take office within 15 days of the 
dissolution of parliament and it must organize general elections within 90 days of the 
dissolution as well as giving the Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC) all the support 
                                                 
5
 See Zingel (2001:661). 
6
 See Khan (1967). 
7
 Source: own compilation based upon a review of literature. 
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necessary for holding free and fair parliamentary elections. The caretaker government 
consists of a Chief Adviser as its head and not more than 10 other advisers, all appointed 
by the President to whom it is also collectively responsible. The Chief Adviser is usually the 
most recently retired Chief Justice, and assumes the functions of the Prime Minister. The 
temporary government exercises executive powers until a new Prime Minister has been 
appointed and his regular Cabinet is formed. However, it is not a fully empowered interim 
government. Besides organizing a democratic transfer of power it is not allowed to make 
any policy decisions that lie beyond the electoral remit or which may influence the electoral 
results. It is restricted to run the necessary day-to-day administration and ordinary routine 
procedures of governance. Under this constitutional framework two caretaker governments 
have been installed so far: one in 1996 and a second in 2001 (cf. Mitra/Wolf/Schöttli, 
2006:93; Molla 2000; Ahmad, 2005, PILDAT, 2006). However, in 2006 the political reality 
turned out to differently. Although there was no direct military takeover, during the period 
from 11 January 2006 until 6 January 2009, Bangladesh lacked an elected government or 
a legally acting substitute. Instead, with the help of the military an administration of 
technocrats was set up that violated all constitutional   restrictions on the functioning of a 
caretaker government.   
 
The caretaker government of 2007-2009 in Bangladesh 
 
Since the introduction of the institution of caretaker government8, political parties, due to 
the excessive politicisation of the country’s institutions, have recurrently been in conflict 
with each other over the formation of these forms of interim administrations (cf. Masum, 
2009:4). In 2006 this led to an extremely violent confrontation between supporters of the 
                                                 
8
 As mentioned above, the institution of caretaker government was introduced in 1996. However, already in 1990 
Bangladesh witnessed its first interim government of Acting President Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed (Ahmad, 
2005:15-16).  
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Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) which paralysed the political 
system (Data, 2010:2; Odhikar, 2009). In consequence, under the directives of the military,9 
the first caretaker government in 2006 of Iajuddin Ahmed, which faced harsh political 
resistance, was forced to resign, the scheduled elections were postponed indefinitely, and 
a second caretaker government under Chief Adviser10 Fakhruddin Ahmed was installed 
(Codron, 2007:93). These two facts, the government being set up under a state of 
emergency -which continued until briefly before the national elections were held in 
December 2008 (Livsey, 2009)- and the almost two-year tenure which exceeded the 
constitutional limit of 90 days, provided Ahmed’s administration with significant powers. 
This was especially prevalent due to the fact that Fakhruddin was not acting like the head 
of a caretaker government (Datta, 2009:18), making key decisions concerning all kinds of 
crucial policy matters which were beyond the constitutional mandate. In order to elaborate 
on this more systematically, the article borrows a concept from civil-military relations theory 
which analytically distinguishes five decision-making areas: elite recruitment, public policy, 
internal security, national defence, and military organization11. Elite Recruitment defines the 
rules, criteria and processes of recruiting, selecting and legitimising political office holders, 
which means the degree of openness of the political processes to competition, and the 
degree of participation, the inclusiveness of political competition (Dahl, 1971: 4–6). Public 
Policy comprises the rules and procedures of the processes of policy-making (‘agenda-
setting’, ‘policy-formulation’, ‘policy-adoption’) and policy-implementation regarding all 
national policies except the narrowly understood aspects of security and defence policy. 
                                                 
9
 The military clearly declined such allegations (Rahman, 2008:14) and then Chief of Army Staff General Moeen U. 
Ahmed stated: “the present government is not a national government supported by the army. It is an independent, non-
partisan caretaker administration” (Reuters, 28.8.2007). However, a statement of the Law and Information Adviser 
Mainul Hosein can be seen as a confirmation of the strong influence of the armed forces in politics: “our present 
government is a national government, army-backed government” (Hosein quoted in The Daily Star, 28.8.2007). See also 
Rahman (2008:1) and The Economist (24.2.2007). 
10
 Chief Adviser of a caretaker government is equivalent to the Prime Minister. However, one has to emphasize that he is 
not elected but appointed by an elected civilian, the President. A caretaker government consists of one Chief Advisor 
and 10 Advisors. 
11
 See in detail: Croissant/Kühn/Chambers/Wolf (2011, 2010).  
14 
Internal Security entails the decisions and concrete actions regarding the preservation and 
restoration of domestic law and order, including counterinsurgency operations, 
counterterrorism and domestic intelligence-gathering, daily law enforcement and border 
control (Collier, 1999; Trinkunas, 2005). National Defence includes all aspects of defence 
policy, ranging from the development of security doctrines to the deployment of troops 
abroad and conduct of war (Alagappa, 2001; Trinkunas, 2005). The area of Military 
Organisation comprises decisions regarding all organizational aspects of the military 
institution, including the ‘hardware’, that is, the military’s institutional, financial and 
technological resources, and the ‘software’ of military organisation, for instance, decisions 
on military doctrine, education, and personnel selection (Bland, 2001; Cottey et al, 2002). 
To begin with, the mere fact that the army had been able to form an unconstitutional 
government indicates that there was no institutionalized control over the military regarding 
elite recruitment, which comprises the processes of selecting, recruiting, and legitimizing 
political office holders. Furthermore, this government depended heavily on the support of 
the armed forces which automatically gave the army significant power in all decision-
making areas. In other words, soldiers rather than the people defined ‘who rules and who 
decides who rules’ (Taylor, 2003:7). Therefore, Bangladesh became ‘a de-facto military 
controlled state’ (Fair/Ganguly, 2007:17). This became evident in several measures and 
proposals by the top brass. Most notable has been Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General 
Moeen U. Ahameds understanding of why the Westminster parliamentary type of 
democracy in Bangladesh failed. This resulted in his suggested solution of forming a ‘new 
political leadership’ and also floated the idea for the need of a ‘democracy with 
Bangladeshi characteristics’ (Roy, 2013). According to Moeen, Bangladesh’s democracy 
had to be reviewed and the constitution had to be revised (Rahman, 2008:15). Therefore, 
he promoted the idea of a balanced power-sharing arrangement between the President 
and Prime Minister which included the notion that the President asserts the right to dismiss 
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the elected Prime Minister and his cabinet as well as to dissolve the government. As a 
consequence, this would revoke the achievements regarding the process of democratic 
transition and formal civilian control, especially through the establishment of a 
parliamentary system.  
Moeen proclaimed that Bangladesh had to develop its own brand of democracy to 
overcome the country’s poor governance: ‘We cannot go back to an elective democracy 
where corruption in society becomes pervasive, government suffers in terms of security 
and violation of rights and where political criminalisation flattens the very survival and 
integrity of the state’ (The Daily Star, 2.4.2007). Therefore the country not only had to build 
a new democratic system but also needed a ‘new leadership at all levels’ (Rahman, 
2008:15). To make this new leadership emerge, ‘power must be balanced, not tilted 
towards any family and dynasty’ (The New Age, 3.4.2007). In order to operationalize COAS 
Moeen’s vision, it was vital that the military gained decision-making power in internal 
security. Subsequently, special acts were passed, e.g. Emergency Powers Ordinance 2007 
(EPO) and Emergency Powers Rules (EPR), which granted the military extraordinary 
powers and impunity and led to the suspension of numerous fundamental rights such as 
the freedom of movement, association, expression and assembly (Odhikar, 2009:5). In 
consequence, normal political activities were criminalized and public access to information 
became limited (Livsey, 2009:21). Furthermore, the armed forces gained control over all 
security forces, since all other security forces, e.g. Bangladesh Rifles (BDR)12, Rapid 
Action Battalion (RAB), Police, as well as the intelligence agencies Directorate General of 
Forces Intelligence (DGFI), National Security Intelligence (NSI) and Special Branch (SB), 
were operating as joint forces under the leadership of the military. These are clear 
indications that, with Fakhruddin’s takeover of office, the ‘military was given power and 
responsibility for maintaining law and order in the country’ (Datta, 2009:16), leading to 
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 Officially renamed into Border Guards Bangladesh on January 23, 2011. 
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military dominance in internal security.  
Regarding Military Organisation and National Defense one has to note, although the 
Defense Ministry under the constitution became subordinated to the President, real power 
over it remained with the caretaker government. Given its dependence on the military’s 
good will to remain in office13, the President did not exercise his powers to challenge the 
support of the caretaker government for the armed forces (International Crisis Group, 
28.4.2008:16-17). Thus, the armed forces regained its influence over the DGFI, which 
functioned as a proxy for the armed forces in decision-making and in cooperating with the 
caretaker government. As such, the DGFI not only became the main driving force behind 
the government but also the prime decision-maker with almost the ‘final say on anything 
the CTG does’ (International Crisis Group, 28.4.2008:16). Both, COAS Moeen and DGFI 
chief Major General Golam Mohammed did not hesitate to take a public stance on national 
issues and policies (Codron, 2007:106). Furthermore, the strong influence of the army in 
decision-making in these areas can be seen in the extraordinary growth of the defence 
budget for 2008-09. With close to a billion Dollar (Tk 64.08 billion or US$ 934 million), it 
was not only 10 billion Takas more than in 2007 and 2008 but it also marked the highest 
defence allocation in the entire history of the country (Zonaki, 2008; Ilahi, 2008). At the 
same time this ignored necessary allocations for other state institutions like the judiciary 
(Zonaki, 2008). Another indicator for the strong influence of the armed forces is the 
upgrade of the post of the CAS/COAS from a Three-Star to a Four-Star General, and the 
following promotion of subordinate officers.14 Furthermore, several retired and active 
officers were appointed to higher offices in the government and in various public sector 
institutions (Bhattacharjee, 2010:17, 28; Datta, 2009, 56-57). 
However, offering a ‘low visible’ channel of influence, the use of the DGFI indicates 
                                                 
13
 Its tenure expired in September 2007, but the army granted him the permission to stay on longer. 
14
 E.g. Principal Staff Officer Major General became Lieutenant General, Commandant of National Defense Academy 
Major General Lieutenant General, and Deputy Director of DGFI, Brigadier General was promoted to Major General 
(Bhattacharjee, 2010:17, 28). 
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that the military preferred not to become involved in politics in a too obvious manner. But 
the armed forces still tried to establish an institutional role for themselves, ensuring that 
they would have an effective political voice. Therefore, the DGFI facilitated the creation of 
new institutions, e.g. in March 2007 ‘National Coordination Committee to Combat 
Corruption and Serious Crimes’ (NCC), in order to build a new political leadership. To 
ensure the influence of the army, the DGFI placed active-duty and retired military officers in 
senior posts. For example, all general officers commanding (GOCs) were members of the 
NCC which was headed by a Major General of the Armed Forces. Furthermore the NCC 
office was set up at the army’s headquarters (Codron, 2007:105; Khalil, 26.9.2007). In fact, 
this can be seen as an indicator for the strong influence of the armed forces on the NCC 
and the imbalance of power between military and caretaker government. Similar processes 
happened not only in the NCC but in other eminent political bodies too, like the Election 
Commission and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). The latter was headed by a 
retired army chief. In the absence of an elected Prime Minister, a not-functional Presidency, 
and the fact that the military-controlled NCC supervised (and commanding) all law-
enforcing agencies and was entrusted with special powers over other state agencies, 
civilian control over the military and security-related public policy issues has appeared to 
be a total misnomer. This includes non-security related public policy. For example, the 
caretaker government granted the military increased influence over business activities 
compared to previous civilian governments, e.g. in 2007 the military took over management 
of Bangladesh Diesel Plant Ltd and 2008 the state-owned enterprise North Bengal Paper 
Mill. Furthermore, the army gained leverage in certain lucrative civilian sectors such as the 
distribution of basic victuals at ‘fair prices’ (daal bhaat) or the Biman Bangladesh Airlines 
Limited (Bhattacharjee, 2010:2). There is no doubt that the activities of the NCC, ACC and 
Election Commission under the guidance of the DGFI aimed to prepare the ground for a 
civilian leadership change in the context of the elections in preparation. Therefore, they 
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attempted the following strategy: First, to expel the two leaders Begum Khaleda Zia and 
Sheikh Hasina Wajed from the country, described as ‘Minus-Two-Formula’; secondly, the 
initiative to replace the senior leadership with a more junior generation. Third, to replace 
‘old’ political parties by creating new ones, e.g. with the help of Nobel Laureate Dr. 
Mohammed Yunus it was intended to build the Nagorik Sakti (Citizens Power). However, 
due to the lack of support from society for an uncertain third force and the strong linkages 
of the well-established BNP and AL with their supporters at the grassroots level, the military 
failed (International Crisis Group, 28.4.2008:16-17). Fourth, via the Election Commission, 
several electoral regulations were issued. For example, a new system for registering of 
political parties was introduced, which had a significant impact on the ability of political 
parties to take part in electoral competition. Due to various requirements like the 
improvement of intra-party democracy and transparency, the number of parties able to take 
part was reduced from around one hundred to thirty-eight. Another measure was the 
redrawing of boundaries of close to 45% of the electoral constituencies affecting the 
electoral prospects of parties. The most crucial activity, carried out directly by the military, 
was the producing of a reliable voters’ list (which included the elimination of 12 million fake 
voters) and the introduction of a national identity card to avoid electoral fraud.15 Fifth, an 
anti-corruption drive was inaugurated. Due to the fact that plans to exile Hasina and Zia did 
not work out, the NCC used corruption charges to remove them from the political 
landscape (Datta, 2009:28-31). Therefore, the joint forces launched a clean-up operation 
against the party organisation of both, the AL and the BNP. The plan was to break down the 
power base of Hasina and Zia in order to marginalise them in the political landscape of 
Bangladesh (Habib, 2007). To sum up, as the military intervened at a time of the deepest 
political crisis after 1990 to ‘protect democratic norms’ it was initially welcomed by civil 
                                                 
15
 See for more details Bangladesh Election Commission, Project: Preparation of Electoral Roll with Photographs and 
Facilitating the Issuance of National Identity (ID) Card, 
http://www.ecs.gov.bd/English/MenuTemplate1.php?Parameter_MenuID=56&ByDate=0&Year=.Devin. 
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society (Pattanaik, 2010:12). In order to avoid isolation and condemnation (Data, 2010:3) 
by Bangladesh’s donors, a power-sharing between the military and technocrats (non-
elected civilians) was arranged and negotiated with the international community, including 
an extra-constitutional two-year window. However, besides some achievements which were 
positively perceived (e.g. ID cards and fixed voters list), the caretaker government failed to 
achieve most of its major aims. This was because of consumer price inflation16, national 
catastrophes, and external shocks like the economic crisis of 2008 which put pressure on 
the regime. In consequence, the society, political parties and their support bases 
(especially associated students, youth and labour organisations) were increasingly 
demanding the return to electoral democracy and the restoration of civilian rule (Muni, 
2009:7). This was an essential change, since until then no one really opposed the 
caretakers (International Crisis Group, 28.4.2008 & 11.12.2008). Additionally, the judiciary 
felt encouraged to start challenging the caretakers’ legitimacy. The frequent outbursts of 
popular anger furthermore forced external actors to promote elections without any further 
delays, the withdrawal of the state of emergency and to distance themselves from the 
military-backed government (Livsey, 2009, 26; Datta, 2009:43). In addition to that, sections 
of society that were co-opted by soldiers (like business people/industrialist or media) were 
withdrawing their support. Differences between the election commission and the army 
became more apparent, e.g. about the scheduling of the elections. Ultimately, it became 
increasingly difficult to implement reforms, which was most obvious in the failed attempt to 
create a National Security Council (Islam, 2008). A successful implementation would define 
the most far-reaching institutional role in the country’s decision-making process for the 
military. But serious concerns among politicians, civil society and media about potential 
ambitions of the COAS to assume the office of President and as such be in charge of the 
most significant decision-making body for all security-related issues, raised vehement 
                                                 
16
 Especially rice, which has soared 60-80% (Tharoor, 2008). 
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resistance against this proposal. The fact that the caretaker government was supporting 
this idea aggravated such critics. Consequently, the COAS had to give up this vision. 
Realizing that the caretaker administration was unable to attract any real domestic and 
international appeal, at the end of 2008, the armed forces reluctantly gave in to new 
elections.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the misuse of the caretaker government, Bangladesh was able to contain the 
unrestricted struggle between the two leading political camps AL and BNP, self-interest of 
civilian leadership, creating chaos and anarchy in a dysfunctional political party system. At 
least temporarily, the military-backed interim administration was able to restore a certain 
kind of stability and subsequently maintained Bangladesh’s status as an electoral 
democracy, as proved in the 2008 index of free and fair elections (Freedom House, 2010). 
But one has also to state that this was accompanied by extraordinary violations of 
fundamental rights of the citizenry. In the context of the military-organized ’clean-up’ of the 
political landscape, around 200,000 people were arrested under charges of political or 
financial corruption (Momen, 2009:69). At the same time, extraordinary human rights 
violations by the security forces were reported. However, the persistent and widespread 
use of preventive detention without charge or trial, numbers of extra-judicial killings and 
tortures etc. is not new for the Bangladeshis. But the fact that immunity for the violation of 
civil rights through the law enfo enforcement personnel was more or less officially granted 
was a new dimension which will remain as serious aberration in the future process of 
democratic consolidation (cf. Amnesty International, 2008). By assessing this, one has also 
to mention that the caretaker government did not help to strengthen civilian institutions. In 
other words, the military created a situation in which the civilian institutions were able to 
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carry out their basic function but remained weak. Furthermore, instead of forming a so 
called ‘new political leadership’, the caretakers were hindering the political parties as well 
as civil societies to generate qualified leadership. Last but not least, since the caretaker 
government got appointed with the support by the military and did not feel the need to act 
according the civic consent. In contrast, the individual preferences and will of the people 
got ignored in the political decision-making. In other words, there was neither any 
responsiveness nor accountability of the caretakers towards the Bangladeshi people. In 
result, the ability and openness of Bangladesh’s political system and the country’s leading 
political elite to accommodate the citizens interests got severe truncated.  
 By observing and evaluating the latest Bangladesh caretaker government - besides 
religious fundamentalism and nationalism- ‘technocracy’ must be seen as one of the major 
challenges for liberalism in South Asia, especially in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Therefore, 
it does not come by surprise that the current democratically elected government in 
Bangladesh abandoned the old concept of caretaker government. Hence, today 
Bangladesh remains a fragile democracy. 
To sum up, being confronted with such an experience, the anti-democratic forces in 
Pakistan have to understand that the ‘magical incantations’ of ‘technocracy’ are nonsense. 
No technocratic (interims) government is superior to a democratic government in a long 
term perspective. Beside very few remarkable achievements of the latest caretaker 
government in Dhaka, most of their policies and actions were not sustainable. In Pakistan, 
the latest military government showed that the soldiers are not much better than the 
civilians when it comes to good governance. The military, as soon as they act substantially 
outside their core business –i.e. defending the country– acts as venal, chaotic and self-
interested like politicians. Finally, one should recall that a technocratic caretaker 
government clearly lacks a democratic mandate (Shain/Linz, 1992). Even if the 
performance of an elected government is pathetic, military and associated technocrats 
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have to realise that the ‘people representatives’ have the right to make mistakes. This is 
because only a popularly chosen government assumes legitimate power and has the right 
to govern.  
To conclude, the paths to democracy are numerous and diverse but a technocratic 
caretaker government as suggested by Qadri and other anti-systemic-forces is without 
doubt the wrong way. However, until the elections are not carried out, there is still no 
guarantee, if the actual caretaker government and the establishment will ‘make or break’ 
the chances for a future democratic scenario for Pakistan.  
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